Letter published in Philosophy Now Issue 127 - August/September 2017

Is Physicalism Wrong, Though?

Dear Editor: It is normal to speak of the brain as a physical object and to speak of our thoughts as mental processes. So then, I hesitate to take issue with the Editor of this magazine over Issue 126’s ‘Why Physicalism is Wrong’; but I cannot agree that the experiences which go on in my mind are not part of the physical properties of my brain. Mr Bartley uses an analogy to show that physical and mental properties are not in the same category: “It seems then that the only warrant for making experience a property of brains would be that experiences are generated by brains. But is water a property of a tap just because every time you turn on a tap you get water?… the water is not a property of the tap in the same intrinsic sense that ‘being metallic’ or ‘being curved’ is a property of the tap.” Now if the brain were indeed simply regulating a flow of thoughts having their origin elsewhere, I could agree with the analogy; but the brain itself produces thoughts. One might as well suggest that flames are not a physical manifestation of a fire. And so I would suggest that our mental processes can properly be said to be a physical property of the brain, however strange this may seem. Although in ordinary life we prefer the language of imagery or reason to describe our experiences, this does not mean that in doing so we provide evidence for the existence of a mental world which is somehow a world apart.

Paul Buckingham, Annecy, France

The original version -

Sir

It is normal to speak of the brain as a physical object and to speak of our thoughts as mental processes. So then, I hesitate to take issue with the editor of this Journal (Issue 126, “Why Physicalism is wrong” – Grant Bartley), but I cannot agree that the experiences which go on in my mind are not part of the physical properties of my brain. He says: “the simplest argument that mind and brain are different is that the properties of thoughts and experiences are utterly distinct from the properties of matter. Thus we can say that the mind and its contents have mental properties – for example, sensations such as an experience of red, or all the distinct properties of thought, emotion, intellect – whereas the brain has physical properties such as weight and spatial extension.“. But it seems to me that this is an arbitrary definition of what is meant by physical properties. Even at this stage in scientific research, we know that the brain’s physical properties are much more than that. They certainly also include the constant chemical changes at the molecular level and the electrical messages going through the nerve fibres and across the synapses, all apparently necessary for a functioning brain to produce the mental world which each one of us inhabits.

Mr Bartley however then uses an analogy to show us that physical and mental properties are not in the same category: “It seems then that the only warrant for making experience a property of brains would be that experiences are generated by brains. But is water a property of a tap just because every time you turn on a tap you get water? Well, in an uninformative sense of ‘property’, the answer is ‘yes’. But the water is not a property of the tap in the same intrinsic sense that ‘being metallic’ or ‘being curved’ is a property of the tap.” If the brain were indeed simply regulating a flow of thoughts having their origin somewhere-else, I could understand the use of the analogy, but it doesn’t. The brain itself produces thoughts. The production of thoughts is integral to its functioning. One might as well suggest that flames are not a physical manifestation of a fire. Admittedly the brain uses information taken in from its various sensory organs, but the processing of that data is in no sense equivalent to the operation of a valve. The processing carried out through the biochemical functioning and other physical properties of the brain comes up with something very different to that raw data. And so, I would suggest, thoughts can properly be said to be a physical property of the brain, however strange this may seem.

To a mediaeval surgeon no doubt the brain’s physical properties would have been confined to its weight, size and probably its squidgyness, Nowadays we know that to describe the physical properties of a brain we would have to include so much more - a description of what we now only dimly understand to be the processes which are integral to our thinking. Why should those properties not include the method by which our brains create a mental picture of our surroundings for us? In ordinary life, we would not normally find it useful to employ the vocabulary of biochemistry to describe our experiences, preferring the language of imagery or reason, but this does not mean that in doing so we provide evidence for the existence of mental world which is somehow a world apart.

Paul Buckingham, Annecy